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This paper evaluates under which conditions different Taylor-type rules lead to 
determinacy and expectational stability (E-stability) of rational expectations 
equilibrium in a simple “New Keynesian” small open economy model, developed 
by Gali and Monacelli (2005). In particular, we extend the Bullard and Mitra 
(2002) results of determinacy and E-stability in a closed economy to this small 
open economy framework. Our results highlight an important link between the 
Taylor principle and both determinacy and learnability of equilibrium in small 
open economies. More importantly, the degree of openness coupled with the 
nature of the policy rule adopted by the monetary authorities might change this 
link in important ways. A key finding is that, contrary to Bullard and Mitra, 
expectations-based rules that involve the CPI and/or the nominal exchange rate 
limit the region of E-stability and the Taylor Principle does not guarantee E-
stability. We also show that some forms of managed exchange rate rules can help 
to alleviate problems of both indeterminacy and expectational instability, yet 
these rules might not be desirable since they promote greater volatility in the 
economy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The implementation of monetary policy in terms of interest rate feedback rules has been 
extensively studied in recent research in both closed and open economies contexts. In practice 
many central banks, most of them in an environment of open economy, have recently adopted 
inflation-targeting regimes where the policy implementation requires a particular policy 
feedback-rule.
2  
In open economies the design of the policy rule and, in particular, the choice between 
consumer and domestic price indexes is key for the implementation of monetary policy. Most 
“Iters’” open economies define their goals in terms of either consumer price inflation (CPI) or 
any “adjusted measure” of CPI, implying that the dynamics of the targeted variable not only 
incorporates the movements of domestic inflation but also responds to changes in the exchange 
rate and world inflation. An additional concern is whether movements in the exchange rate have 
to be included in the policy rule besides the standard elements such as inflation and the output 
gap; see Taylor (2001). For example, Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) have found robust evidence, 
by using Bayesian structural estimation, that the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England 
include the nominal exchange rate in their policy rules.
3 Yet, the role of these rules in stabilizing 
the economy has been criticized recently on many grounds.  
One major problem is the issue of whether a policy rule guarantees real determinacy. In a 
closed economy context, the usual condition for determinacy is the so-called “Taylor Principle”  
see Woodford (2003b). In particular, this condition suggests that if the nominal interest rate is 
adjusted positively, and more than one-for-one, in response to inflation movements above its 
target, and positively to output above target, a determinate Rational Expectation Equilibrium 
(REE) is attainable. Taylor’s intuition is that under such a rule, a rise in inflation brings about an 
increase in the real interest rate, which reduces demand, and inflationary pressures, bringing the 
economy back towards the targeted equilibrium. Nevertheless, it has been stressed that some 
                                                       
2 Nowadays, the list of Inflation Targeters (ITers) covers more than 20 central banks and the number of central 
banks which could potentially adopt such a policy in the future is non-negligible. See Vega and Winkelried (2005) 
for a detailed list of both developed and developing countries that are implementing an IT regime. 
3 This is a widespread feature among developing countries as is documented by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). They 
coined the phrase “Fear of Floating,” referring to those Central Banks that systematically tend to defend their 
exchange rates by increasing interest rates.   5
kind of Taylor-type rules can induce real indeterminacy with undesirable properties under a 
rational expectation environment even if the Taylor Principle holds.
4  
A second major issue is that the interest rate feedback rules might not perform 
satisfactorily if we relax the assumption of rational expectations by assuming that agents follow a 
learning process. A particular concern to this literature is the notion of Expectational Stability (or 
E-stability) developed by Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001): the conditions under which 
agents are able to learn the reduced form dynamics induced by the model given a monetary 
policy rule under the assumption of rational expectations. Even when a determinate equilibrium 
exists, coordination at that equilibrium cannot be assured if the assumption of rational 
expectations is relaxed. E-stability therefore provides a robustness criterion: if agents make small 
mistakes in expectations relative to those consistent with the associated REE, then a policy rule 
that is E-stable ensures such mistakes are corrected over time.  
Recently, Evans and Honkapohja (2003) evaluate the issue of E-stability under optimal 
rules, finding that the optimal rule under discretion is unstable if agents follow adaptive 
learning.
5 Similarly, Bullard and Mitra (2002, hereafter BM) have shown that if agents follow 
adaptive learning rules, then the stability of the Taylor-type rules might not be taken for granted. 
Yet, their results support the Taylor principle based on the learnability criteria. In particular, they 
find that if the monetary authority is able to commit to a Taylor-type interest rate rule, the REE is 
E-stable under learning dynamics as long as the Taylor principle is satisfied.  
What is clear from the above discussion is that, in open economies, a central bank can 
implement its policy on a broader variety of instrument rules such as CPI target, domestic 
inflation target, managed exchange rate targets and, hence, a rational expectation equilibrium can 
be learnable or not under different conditions. In a closed economy there is no difference 
between domestic inflation and CPI inflation target, nor is there room for a managed exchange 
rate rule target. Thus, trade openness modifies the way that any shock is transmitted to domestic 
variables and therefore the findings concerning determinacy and learnability for the closed 
economy might be altered.  
                                                       
4 See Bernanke and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (1999) for a closed economy case, Batini et al. (2004) for a 
two-country model, and De Fiori and Liu (2005) for the small open economy counterpart. 
5 They also show that this problem can be solved if private expectations are observed and suitably incorporated into 
the policymaker's optimal rule.   6
Thus, the goal of this paper is to evaluate the effects of trade openness coupled with a 
variety of Taylor-rules on the stability of an economy. We study both local determinacy and 
learnability properties of the Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE) in the small open 
economy model proposed by Gali and Monacelli (2005, henceforth GM). The methodology for 
the learning analysis is the one postulated by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). In particular, we 
evaluate whether agents in a small open economy can learn the fundamental equilibrium of the 
system induced by different classes of Taylor-type feedback rules. We use the criterion of 
expectational stability to calculate whether rational expectations equilibria are stable under real 
time recursive learning dynamics.
6 In this sense, our work extends BM’s (2002) closed-economy 
results to a small open economy framework.  
We perform the analysis of real determinacy and learning under four simple monetary 
policy feedback rules. The two first rules are typical Taylor rules. For the first one we assume 
that the central bank adjusts the short-term interest rate by responding systematically to domestic 
inflation and the output gap. For the second rule it is assumed that the central bank targets CPI 
inflation instead of domestic inflation. The third and fourth rules modify the two previous rules 
by adding a reaction to movements in nominal exchange rate. Thus, the third rule combines a 
reaction to CPI inflation, the output gap and the change in the nominal exchange rate. The fourth 
rule supplements the first rule with a reaction to movements in the exchange rate as well. 
Following closely BM (2002) we evaluate the aforementioned rules under two specifications 
based on the way the central bank and private agents form expectations. In the first one, the 
monetary authority reacts to current values; this is called contemporaneous data specification. 
Our second specification assumes that policymakers react to forecasts; this is called forecast-
based rule specification.  
In general, our results highlight an important link between the Taylor Principle and both 
determinacy and learnability of REE. Yet, the degree of openness coupled with the nature of the 
policy rule adopted by the monetary authorities might change this link in important ways. A key 
finding is that, contrary to BM (2002), expectations-based rules that involve the CPI and/or the 
nominal exchange rate limit the region of E-stability, and the Taylor Principle does not guarantee 
                                                       
6 Evans and Honkapohja (2001) have shown that local convergence of real time recursive algorithms for a variety of 
models is governed by the expectational stability of the rational expectation equilibrium. 
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E-stability. We find analytical results for determinacy and E-stability in most of the rules 
considered.  
The main findings of our analysis can be summarized as follows: Under forecast-based 
rules, openness alters the conditions of both determinacy and learnability rules with respect to 
the closed economy case. The striking result is that unlike BM (2002), forward-looking policy 
rules that react aggressively to CPI inflation with little or no reaction to the output gap do not 
necessarily induce both determinate and learnable rational expectation equilibria. For instance, in 
an open economy environment, it is more likely that the economy lies in an E-unstable region. 
Openness adds an upper bound to a reaction to inflation. This main finding carries over to the 
managed exchange rate case as well. Therefore, under both CPI inflation targeting and managed 
exchange rate rule, there can be important limits on how aggressive a central bank may wish to 
be with respect to inflation in an open economy setting. Interestingly, domestic inflation 
targeting with or without a reaction to movement to the nominal exchange rates does not have 
this flavor. Instead, the analytical results under the previous rules suggest that more aggressive 
reaction to domestic inflation is all to the good as in the closed economy case suggested by BM. 
One important implication of these results is that the pure application of the Taylor Principle in 
open economies could be misleading advice if policymakers target CPI inflation or stabilize 
exchange rate movements in a forward-looking fashion.  
With  contemporaneous rules, openness affects the determinacy and learnability 
conditions only quantitatively. Monetary policy rules of this type can easily induce a determinate 
equilibrium. Moreover, when equilibrium is determinate it is also learnable. The quantitative 
impact of openness is ambiguous, depending mainly on the degree of elasticity of substitution 
between foreign and domestic goods.
7 More importantly, conditions for a unique and learnable 
REE do not depend on whether the central bank responds to domestic or CPI inflation, i.e., the 
Taylor Principle is a necessary and sufficient condition under both policies. Interestingly, we 
find that the monetary policy authority in a small open economy can substitute CPI inflation 
stabilization to some degree for exchange rate smoothing when rules are contemporaneous. That 
                                                       
7 Central Banks in open economies face a monetary transmission mechanism that differs from the one prevailing in 
the closed economy counterpart. The standard channel in closed economy models is the intertemporal substitution 
effect, whereas in open economy the substitutability between goods of different origin becomes relevant, activating 
the so-called terms of trade effect. In general, the terms of trade effect tends to reinforce the intertemporal 
substitution effect as long as domestic and foreign goods are substitutes, as GM pointed out. 
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is, even if the policymakers do not react sufficiently forcefully to CPI inflation they can still 
induce determinacy and learnability of equilibrium by reacting sufficiently forcefully to the 
nominal exchange rate. Therefore, policymakers would face a trade-off in the case of 
contemporaneous rules: a managed exchange rate regime is more suitable than other monetary 
rules because it increases the areas of determinacy and learnability but at the same time 
empowers macroeconomic volatility because it might impede the economy’s adjustment to 
fundamental shocks.  
Which rule is the more desirable for a small open economy? Under contemporaneous 
data specifications, there is no difference between targeting either current values of domestic or 
CPI inflation. Indeed, both rules can induce a determinate and learnable equilibrium to the extent 
that the Taylor Principle holds. However, previous rules augmented with a reaction to 
movements in the nominal exchange rate might be more suitable since they alleviate problems of 
indeterminacy and expectational instability. However, these rules, as shown in GM, could 
generate greater macro volatility. On the other hand, under forecast-based data specification, we 
show that targeting domestic inflation avoids potential expectational unstable problems which 
arise when the central bank targets either CPI inflation and movements in the exchange rate or 
both.  
Interestingly, when a forecast-based domestic inflation Taylor rule is augmented by 
targeting movements in the nominal exchange rate, the regions of both determinacy and E-
stability become larger, promoting learnability of the equilibrium. This result can be interpreted 
as if this type of rule has desirable determinacy and learnability properties, and therefore, it 
might be an important reason why central banks in small open economies target movements in 
the exchange rate. Yet, the previous argument should be taken cautiously. In this regard, in 
Section 4 we show analytically that even though a forecast-based domestic inflation Taylor rule 
supplemented by targeting movements in the nominal exchange rate might have desirable 
properties in terms of E-stability, conditional on the source of shocks, it could also generate 
larger volatility in the economy (with respect to a rule that does not target changes in the 
exchange rate). In particular, our analytical results confirm that, if the economy is hit by shocks 
to the natural interest rate (i.e., productivity), the aforementioned type of rule will be desirable in 
terms of both E-stability properties and macroeconomic volatility (the unconditional volatility of 
the output gap and domestic inflation are smaller than otherwise). On the contrary, if the   9
economy is hit by a foreign interest rate shock, this type of rule promotes greater volatility in the 
output gap and domestic inflation and consequently is less desirable compared to rule that does 
not react to movements in the exchange rate.
8 We conclude that it is worthwhile to recommend 
not only rules that are desirable in terms of determinacy and learnability properties, but also 
those that induce benefits in terms of macroeconomic volatility.  
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we obtain not only analytical conditions 
of determinacy, but also of learnability. Second, our analysis relies on a broad set of policy rules 
for small open economies, including those supported by the data, e.g., Taylor rules with managed 
exchange rates.
9 In that sense, our paper contributes to a growing literature that has been 
studying stability issues in a open economy context. In an small open economy version of the 
Cooley and Hansen (1989) model, De Fiori and Liu (2005) find that the conditions for 
determinacy depend crucially on the degree of openness to international trade in both flexible 
and sticky price specifications. Zanna (2003) in a model with tradable and nontradable goods 
find similar results regarding to the role of openness. Similarly, focusing on determinacy, Batini 
et al. (2004) study forward-looking policy rules along with interest rate inertia for different 
forecast horizons in a two-country model. Their results point out that potential local 
indeterminacy is exacerbated in the open economy regardless of whether CPI or domestic 
inflation enters in the policy rule. In a multiple-large-economies model, Bullard and Singh 
(2006) show numerically that the open economy setting puts an important upper bound on the 
reaction of a central bank with respect to expected CPI inflation deviations in order to guarantee 
determinacy. Our results with forward looking rules show analytically the existence of such a 
remarkable limit on the aggressiveness of policymakers in open economies. Furthermore, this 
upper limit arises not only for conditions of determinacy but also for E-stability.  
A closer paper to ours is that of Bullard and Schaling (2006) who study determinacy and 
learnability in a two-country model under both instrument and target rules. Some their results 
regarding instrument rules parallel ours. For example, they show, as we do, that with 
contemporaneous domestic or CPI inflation targeting, openness alters determinacy and learning 
conditions at least numerically. Yet, the Taylor Principle is a necessary and sufficient condition 
                                                       
8 GM’s findings show that a perfect peg rule enhances greater macroeconomic volatility in terms of output and 
inflation. Yet, they analyze the extreme case of a perfect peg. Our analytical results focus on a flexible managed 
exchange rate, and we show that this kind of rule does not necessarily induce greater volatility. Volatility will 
instead depend on the source of shocks.   10
to be met independently in both home and foreign economies. Still, we study instrument rules 
more extensively than Bullard and Schaling (2006), including different specifications 
(contemporaneous and forecast-based) of Taylor-type rules.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the simple environment 
for the analysis of determinacy and learning. Here we specify the main equations of the GM 
(2005) model, emphasizing its differences with respect to the closed economy case. After that, 
we describe the different specifications of monetary policy rules and methodology. The analysis 
of determinacy and E-stability is addressed in Section 3. In Section 4 we solve analytically the 
rational expectations equilibrium of the small open economy in order to establish a link between 
the conditions that guarantee E-stability and the implied macroeconomic volatility induced by 
two types of rules, namely, the domestic inflation Taylor rule and the previous rule supplemented 
with a target to movements in the exchange rate. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The Simple Environment 
 
We study a simple small open economy model developed by GM (2005). The model is built up 
by assuming a small open economy with staggered prices à la Calvo (1983) as one among a 
continuum of (infinitesimally small) economies making up the world economy. One interesting 
property of GM's model is that it is isomorphic to the workhorse sticky price model of a closed 
economy of Woodford (2003b). More specifically, GM’s model is identical to the closed 
economy model if the degree of openness collapses to zero. This feature allows us to isolate the 
effects of openness and study its interaction with monetary policy. The main purpose is to obtain 
conditions that are necessary and sufficient to guarantee a determinate and E-stable equilibrium 
and assess the roles of openness and monetary policy on these grounds.  
 
2.1 The Model 
In this section we briefly present and discuss the main equations of the GM (2005) framework. 
Before proceeding with the exposition of the model, we describe some useful notation used 
throughout the paper. Subscript  denotes any domestic or home variable, subscript  denotes 
                                                                                                                                                                           
9 See Lubik and Schorfheide (2006).   11
foreign or imported variables (in domestic currency), superscript ` ' denotes variables in their 
natural levels, and superscript * denotes international or world variables.  
The small open economy is log-linearized at a steady state and can collapse to the 
following two equations,  (equations 36 and 37 of GM), 
 (1) and (2) 
where  
 
and   
The variables  ,  and  represent the domestic output gap, domestic inflation, and 
domestic interest rate, respectively. In the model  is the small open economy’s natural level of 
real interest rate, and  symbolizes the standard expectation operator. We implicitly base our 
analysis of learning and monetary policy on a “Euler Equation” approach, as suggested in 
Honkapohja et al. (2003). Therefore, throughout the paper we assume that our systems are valid 
under both rational expectations and learning. In this sense, the expectation operation is taken to 
describe aggregate behavior regardless of the precise nature of agents’ expectation formation. 
Recently, Preston (2005) has proposed an interesting reformulation of intertemporal behavior 
under learning in which agents are assumed to incorporate a “subjective version” of their 
intertemporal budget constraint into their behavior under learning. In this paper, we abstract from 
this approach.  
Equation (1) is a new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) and equation (2) is a dynamic IS-
type. Both equations involve several deep parameters. The parameter  denotes the discount 
factor,  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (or the inverse of risk aversion),  is the 
inverse of labor supply elasticity,  is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign 
goods,  is the elasticity of substitution between imported goods,  is the inverse of home bias in 
preferences and can be interpreted as a natural index of trade openness, and  is the degree of 
price stickiness.    12
Notice that the coefficients  and  depend on parameters that are specific to the open 
economy, i.e., the degree of openness and the substitutability among goods of different origin. 
On one hand, the degree of openness,  affects the dynamics of domestic inflation only through 
its influence on the size of the slope of the Phillips curve, i.e., the size of response to any given 
variation in the output gap. In the open economy, a change in domestic output has an effect on 
marginal cost through its impact on employment (captured by  ) and the terms of trade 
(captured by  ). In particular, under the assumption that  , an increase in openness 
dampens the impact of the adjustment on inflation after an output gap shock. On the other hand, 
the degree of openness influences the sensitivity of the output gap to interest rate changes. In 
particular, if  , an increase in openness raises that sensitivity through the stronger effects 
of the induced terms if trade changes on demand.  
Considering the definitions of  and  given above, a special case arises. When the 
small open economy is totally autarkic (  is zero),  reduces to  . In this case, equations (1) 
and (2) collapse to the standard closed economy model of Woodford (2003b).
10  
Under the assumption of complete international financial markets, GM (2005) obtain a 
version of the uncovered interest parity condition. Log-linearizing around a perfect foresight 
steady state, 
(3) 
where  is the nominal exchange rate and  is the world interest rate, equation (3) implies that 
an expected depreciation (appreciation) of the nominal exchange rate is necessary to 
counterbalance any positive (negative) difference between the domestic interest rate and the 
world interest rate.  
Let us define the log level of terms of trade  as, 
(4) 
                                                       
10 Another case discussed by GM (2005) is when  , which implies  Under this case, there 
is a balance of trade at all times.   13
where  and  are the log level of foreign prices and domestic prices, respectively. Given that 
it is straightforward to obtain an expression for the rate of change in the terms of trade, i.e., 
  
  (5) 
where  is foreign inflation and  . Combining the last equation 
with equation (14) of GM (2005), it is a matter of a few algebraic operations to obtain the 
following definition of CPI inflation, 
  (6) 
where  is CPI inflation. This makes CPI inflation a weighted average between 
domestic and foreign inflation in domestic currency, where the weighting factor is the degree of 
openness.  
Assuming that the law of one prices holds for individual goods at all times, GM (2005) 
shows that 
   (7) 
with  representing the log level of the world price index. This equation also implies that 
(8) 
From (5) and (8) it follows that the rate of change in the terms of trade, the rate of change of 
nominal exchange rate, domestic inflation and world inflation are linked according to 
 (9) 
Let us define the terms of trade gap  as the deviation of (log) domestic terms of trade  from its 
natural level  , where the latter is in turn defined as the equilibrium level of terms of trade in 
the absence of nominal rigidities. Formally, 
(10) 
Using this definition of terms of trade gap and equation (9) we have 
(11)   14
Manipulating equations (29) and (34) from GM (2005), we obtain an equivalence between the 
output gap and the terms of trade gap, 
(12) 
 
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that world variables  are constant and equal to 
their steady state level. For the sake of simplicity, we further assume that the world steady state 
level is centered at zero for both world variables. Additionally, as in BM (2002), domestic 
variables at their natural levels  are driven by exogenous and mutually independent 
first-order autoregresive processes. We keep this assumption on the basis that 
cannot be affected by the small open economy's policies or aggregate performance around its 
local equilibrium. 
 
2.2 Simple Taylor Rules 
 
We supplement equations (1) through (12) with a policy rule for the domestic interest rate  that 
represents the behavior of the monetary authority. We consider a handful of possible Taylor-type 
feedback rules with different sets of target variables. All the feedback rules have two alternative 
specifications: contemporaneous data and forecast-based data. In the first type, the interest rate 
reacts to information observed at time  that is, current inflation (domestic or CPI), domestic 
output gap and/or nominal exchange rate changes. In the forecast-based specification, interest 
rates react to one period ahead expectation of the targeted variables.
11  
1.  Domestic Inflation Taylor Rule (DITR). We first consider a “simple” rule 
similar to the one proposed by the seminal work of Taylor (1993). In this rule, 
it is assumed that the central bank adjusts the domestic interest rate by 
responding systematically to both (contemporaneous or expected) domestic 
inflation and the domestic output gap 
 
                                                       
11 For a general discussion about this class of policy setting, see Battini and Haldane (1999). Empirical evidence also 
suggests that central banks indeed set their interest rate in a forward-looking fashion.   15
                             (13) and (14) 
 
where  and  are non-negative parameters and measure the aggressiveness 
of monetary policy response to any deviation of (contemporaneous or 
expected) domestic inflation and output gap from their target values, 
respectively.  
2.  CPI Inflation Taylor Rule (CPITR). For the second feedback rule, it is 
assumed that the central bank targets CPI inflation, rather than domestic 
inflation, and the domestic output gap. This type of rule seems to be more 
realistic among actual central banks adopting inflation targeting regimes. 
Under this specification, domestic inflation in (13) and (14) is replaced by CPI 
inflation 
(15) and (16) 
Notice that the inclusion of CPI inflation in the policy rule implies an indirect 
response of the interest rate to foreign inflation. The sensitivity of the interest 
rate to foreign inflation shocks is given by the Central Bank’s aggressiveness 
towards any deviation (contemporaneous or expected) of CPI inflation from 
its target and the size of openness. Moreover, this rule also implies an indirect 
reaction to the movements of the nominal exchange rate.  
3.  CPI Managed Exchange Rate Taylor Rule (CPI-METR). Along the same line 
as Taylor (2001), we focus on an open economy interest rate reaction function 
where the central bank reacts changes in the exchange rate next to CPI 
inflation rate and the domestic output gap, 
(17) and (18) 
where  captures the endogenous response of the Central Bank to 
(contemporaneous or expected) changes in the nominal exchange rate. As the   16
other policy parameters, we restrict the value of  to be non-negative. Lubik 
and Schorfheide (2006) have found robust evidence that the Bank of Canada 
and the Bank of England follow similar policy rules.  
4.  Domestic Inflation  Managed Exchange Rate Taylor Rule (DI-METR). The 
fourth representation adds to the first rule considered a reaction to movements 
in the nominal exchange rate 
(19) and (20) 
These two rules are isolated from the effects of nominal exchange rate and 
openness on the CPI index. Instead, they focus only on those characteristics 
added by a direct reaction to movements of the nominal exchange rate.  
 
2.3 Methodology 
Consider a model given by the general form 
 (21) and (22) 
where  is an  vector of endogenous variables,  is an  vector of constants,  ,  and 
are  x  matrices of coefficients, and  is an  vector of exogenous variables which is 
assumed to follow a stationary VAR, so that  is an  vector of white noise errors.  
The first issue of concern is under which circumstances a policy rule guarantees a unique 
or determinate rational expectations equilibrium. The criterion for this purpose is to ask whether 
a system such as (21) has the right number of eigenvalues inside the unit circle given the number 
of free and predetermined variables.
12 The second issue is the study of conditions for REE to be 
learnable under different policy rules. Here, we follow closely the criterion of Expectational 
Stability (or E-stability) developed by Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001). Under learning, the 
agents do not have rational expectations; instead agents form their expected values with adaptive 
rules which are updated as data is produced by the system.  
                                                       
12 For details see Blanchard and Kahn (1980).   17
Consider the Minimal State Variable (MSV) solution (see McCallum, 1983) of (21) and 
(22) which takes the following form, 
(23) 
Taking expectations of (23),  and replacing it in (21), we can 
solve for  by applying the method of undetermined coefficients. 
(24), (25) and (26) 
 
Under learning, the MSV solution (23) is known as the Perceived Law of Motion (PLM) of the 
agents. Using it to form the next period expectation,  , we can compute 
the Actual Law of Motion (ALM), 
(27) 
To analyze the E-stability conditions, we have to check the stability of the mapping  from the 
PLM to ALM, 
(28) 
The answer of the question of whether the system is stable under learning is given by the 
principle of E-stability, which comes from analyzing the following matrix differential equation, 
(29) 
where  is a notional time. The E-stability conditions are derived in Evans and Honkapohja 
(2001, p. 238), proposition 10.3,
13  
                                                       
13 Those conditions correspond to  dating expectations, which assumes that agents have access to an information set 
including  and  Other information set corresponds to  dating expectations. For further details see Chapter 
10 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001). 
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(30), (31) and (32) 
 
The rational expectation solution  is  E-stable or learnable if all real parts of the 
eigenvalues of  are lower than 1. The solution is E-unstable if 
any of them have a real part higher than 1.  
 
2.4 Parametrization 
In order to gain an insight into the effects of openness and the alternative policy rules 
specifications on determinacy and learnability conditions, we illustrate the results by using a 
calibrated case. In our benchmark calibration most of the parameters are taken from GM (2005). 
That is, the elasticity substitution between imported goods  , the probability of not adjusting 
prices  , and the discount factor  , are set at 1, 0.75 and 0.99, respectively.  
We depart from the GM (2005) calibration in four parameters:  ,  and  . In the first 
case, we let the degree of openness  take two possible values:  or  , where the former 
characterizes our completely closed economy, whereas the latter characterizes our open 
economy.
14  In the second and third case, the elasticity of substitution between foreign and 
domestic goods  and the coefficient of risk aversion  , are set equal to 1.5 and 5, respectively, 
according to Chari et al. (2002). This allows us to study the effects of openness on both 
determinacy and learnability through its impacts on the parameters of the system as discussed in 
Section 2.1. The inverse of the elasticity of labor supply  takes the value of  according to 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).  
Finally, we consider that all variables in their natural levels ( ) follow AR(1) 
processes with persistence less than one and zero cross correlation. As in BM (2002) we calibrate 
the policy reaction parameters for non-negative values (   ,  and  )  
                                                       
14 The value of 0.4 corresponds roughly to the import/GDP ratio for the Canadian economy.   19
3. Policy Rules, Determinacy and Learning 
 
3.1 Domestic Inflation Taylor Rules 
 
3.1.1 Contemporaneous Specification (DITR) 
 
First we study the case in which the central bank uses a contemporaneous Domestic Inflation 
Taylor Rule (DITR) of the form of (13). To obtain the determinacy and E-stability conditions 
under this case, we combine equations (1), (2) and (13), so the model boils down to a two 
dynamic equation system involving domestic variables  and   
(33) 
where  ,  ,  and 
, (34) 
We omit  since it is not important for either determinacy or E-stability analyses.
15 Determinacy 
is analyzed by asking under which conditions  has both of its eigenvalues inside the unit circle.  
Second, we study the stability of the system when agents no longer have rational 
expectations and instead form expectations using adaptive rules. Under this scenario, we assume 
that agents utilize the PLM that corresponds to the MSV solution,
16  
 (35) 
with  and  Then, we question whether or not E-stability conditions hold 
for different values for the parameters in the policy rule.  
Equations (1) and (2) only involve domestic variables, thus the open economy effects 
come into the model only in the sense that the coefficients are altered relative to the closed 
economy case. In fact, an important case occurs when  is zero so that the economy is closed and 
the model is the same as in Woodford (2003b). Furthermore, DITR is in essence the same as the 
so-called contemporaneous data interest rule of BM (2002). Therefore, it should not be 
                                                       
15 For the sake of simplicity we henceforth purposely omit matrices that are not relevant for either determinacy or E-
stability analyses. 
16 Note that we include an intercept vector although the MSV solution does not have it. However, in practice agents 
will need to estimate intercept as well as slope parameters.   20
surprising that determinacy and learnability conditions of the open economy coincide with 
conditions derived by BM (2002).  
Recalling Propositions 1 and 2 of BM (2002) we have that under DITR the necessary and 
sufficient condition for determinacy and learnability is given by 
(36) 
The only difference between (36) and the conditions provided in Propositions 1 and 2 of 
BM (2002) is that coefficients are now influenced by open economy considerations such as the 
degree of openness and the substitutability between foreign and domestic goods.
17   
Despite the difference mentioned above, condition (36) still corresponds to the Taylor 
Principle: facing inflationary pressures, the central bank increases its interest rate by more than 
the rise in inflation, which raises real interest rates until inflation returns to the target. As 
emphasized by BM (2002), such a policy succeeds in stabilizing the economy towards its 
rational expectation equilibrium. When there is no response to the output gap,  is 
sufficient for the Taylor Principle to be satisfied. But even for values of  , the policy 
authority can compensate for a relatively low value of  by choosing a sufficiently large value 
of  in such a way as to still satisfy condition (36). 
In order to examine the effect of openness on the stability of the economy, Figure 1 
depicts determinacy and E-stable regions as functions of  and  under different degrees of 
openness. In all cases the rest of the parameters are set at their baseline values.
18.  
The numerical results reveal that the line between determinacy and E-stable and 
Indeterminate and E-unstable regions steps up as the degree of openness approaches to zero. 
Thus, whenever  relatively closed economies need greater responses to the output gap. 
Therefore, the more closed the economy, the tighter are the constraints faced by policymakers. 
The explanation behind this outcome relies on the effects of openness on  If  an 
increase of openness has a positive effect, increasing the area of determinacy and E-stability 
through the reduction of  . This positive effect decays non-monotonically with the degree of 
                                                       
17 GM have also found the same condition, although in our paper we explore, in addition, the E-stability conditions. 
18 Although one case corresponds to the closed-economy case, the graphic does not coincide with BM (2002, Figure 
1) due to differences in calibration.   21
openness: the area of determinacy and E-stability with a mild degree of openness  is  is not 
greatly different from the corresponding area with a completely open economy  is  . 
 
Figure 1. Regions of Determinacy and E-stability for Contemporaneous DITR 
under different degrees of openness. 
 
The intuition behind the enlargement of the determinate and learnable region stems from 
the terms of trade effect on inflation dynamics. Specifically, a positive (negative) output gap is 
offset by an increment (reduction) of the terms of trade, which causes an expenditure switching 
effect from domestic (foreign) towards foreign (domestic) goods. As a consequence, in relatively 
more open economies a central bank can be less concerned with the output gap because its 
fluctuations have lower impacts on domestic inflation. Note that when  the opposite result 
holds, whereby we would observe a reduction of both the determinate and learnable regions as 
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3.1.2 Forecast-Based Specification  
Under a forecast-based Domestic Inflation Taylor Rule (FB-DITR), we can again collapse the 
system of equations (1), (2) and (14) to two equations involving the endogenous variables  and 
 
 (37) 
where  ,  and  is defined by, 
(38) 
For  -dating of expectations, the MSV solution takes the form of  with  and 
 
Since the feedback policy rule (14) has the same form of the forward expectation rule 
studied in BM (2002), the same arguments discussed above apply here. Therefore, we use 
conditions for determinacy and E-stability given by Propositions 4 and 5 of BM (2002), 
respectively. Proposition 4 states that the necessary and sufficient conditions for a rational 
expectation equilibrium to be determinate under a forward expectation policy rule are 
 (39), (40) and (41) 
On the other hand, Proposition 5 indicates that a necessary condition of the MSV solution 
to be E-stable is that 
 (42) 
Figure 2 illustrates the intersections of the regions of determinacy and learnability of the 
MSV solution at the baseline parametrization under both closed and open economies. Unlike 
DITR, determinate equilibrium is always expectationally stable, but the opposite does not occur 
due to restrictions (39) and (40).  
In general, for both closed and open economies, a FB-DITR described by  and a 
relatively small response to output gap guarantees a determinate and learnable equilibrium, while   23
an indeterminate but E-stable equilibrium exists for high values of  and medium values of  .
19 
With our baseline parametrization, an increase in the size of openness lowers the determinate and 
learnable area because restriction (40) tends to bind  . This is due to the fact that an increase in 
openness reduces  and thus reduces the upper bound of  . Therefore, under FB-DITR, 
openness to trade jeopardizes the Central Bank’s ability to stabilize the economy.  
 














Note: Closed  and open  economies 
 




In this section we assume that the central bank sets its interest rate according to a 
contemporaneous CPI Inflation Taylor rule (CPITR), given by (15). In an open economy 
domestic inflation differs from CPI inflation due to the presence of an additional endogenous 
variable, the terms of trade. We depart from the earlier analyses by formulating the dynamics of 
the small open economy in terms of domestic inflation, nominal exchange rate and terms of trade 
gap. To do that, we combine equations (1), (3), (11) and (15) and use definitions (6) and (12).  
Notice that the Taylor rule (15) can be re-expressed as: 
                                                       
19 Indeterminacy and instability coexist when  is too large. This area is not shown in the graph because the value   24
 (43) 
where  and  This rule embeds DITR since, instead of having the 
reaction to domestic inflation,  equal to  under this rule the implied reaction to domestic 
inflation is smaller and equal to  Yet, in addition there is an implicit reaction to 
contemporaneous changes to the exchange rate that will add some inertia to the rational 
expectation equilibrium. The model can be re-written as a system of three equations of the form 
(44), (45) and (46)  
And the exogenous variable  follows 
(47) 
The collapsed system of three equations involving the endogenous variables  and  can 
be represented as 
(48) 
where  . Variable  collects non-predetermined variables, 
whereas  collects states or predetermined variables. Vector  denotes the exogenous variables 
of the system. Matrix  is given by 
 (49) 
Since there exists one predetermined variable (lag of terms of trade gap), the equilibrium is 
determinate if and only if the matrix  has exactly two eigenvalues outside the unit circle and one 
                                                                                                                                                                           
of  in this case so far exceeds the limit for this parameter in the calibration.   25
eigenvalue inside the unit circle. Woodford (2003b, Chapter 4) analyzes such a system like (48) 
and derives the necessary and sufficient conditions for a determinate equilibrium. In fact, the 
system analyzed here is similar to the one for a closed economy under policy inertia studied by 
Woodford (2003a). The following proposition summarizes the result. 
Proposition 1.  Under CPITR the necessary and sufficient condition for a rational 
expectations equilibrium to be unique is that  
(50) 
Proof. See Appendix A.  
 













Note: Closed  and open  economies.  
 
Apparently (50) is different from the Taylor principle, but after replacing  and  , 
we can note that (50) becomes  . Therefore, as in the case of 
contemporaneous DITR, the Taylor Principle completely characterizes determinacy, i.e., any 
active policy rule ( ) can induce a determinate equilibrium. The reason behind this result 
relies on the fact that lower reaction to domestic inflation is canceled out by the implicit reaction 
to nominal exchange movements. The previous finding is an analytically novel result and can 
also be useful in analyzing determinacy and learnability in a two-sector closed economy model   26
as in Aoki (2001).
20 However, there is a difference between targeting CPI inflation and domestic 
inflation: as pointed out by GM, the implied macroeconomic volatility of the endogenous 
variables will be larger under the CPITR.  
To analyze the stability under learning, we re-write the system (48) as 
(51) 
where  . Matrices are 
(52), (53) and (54) 
where   
First, we perform a numerical evaluation for the conditions of E-stability, then we will 
explain the analytics. We calculate the MSV solution using the method of undetermined 
coefficients. We assume the following form of the MSV solution 
(55) 
where  and matrices  and  satisfy 
(56) and (57) 
                                                       
20 As emphasized by Aoki (2001), there is a parallel between a small open economy model like the one we use and 
his two-sector closed economy model. In a small open economy, the domestic sector is analogous to a sector 
showing prices stickiness, whereas the foreign sector is analogous to the one showing flexible prices. Therefore, our 
result suggests that the Taylor principle could be a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy in a two-
sector closed economy model.   27
provided the matrix  is invertible. Restriction (56) could lead to multiple stationary 
solutions for  . A determinate equilibrium requires a unique solution for  with all eigenvalues 
inside the unit circle. After solving numerically (56) and (57), E-stability conditions given by 
(30) through (32) are evaluated.  
Figure 3 plots the determinate and learnable areas for both closed-economy and open-
economy. The numerical results suggest that determinate equilibrium is always learnable. 
Therefore, with contemporaneous data in the policy rule there is no difference between targeting 
domestic inflation or consumer price inflation.
21 Numerical results also show that the area of E-
stability augments when openness increases if and only if  It is surprisingly that, when 
the policymakers include CPI inflation in the contemporaneous specification nothing changes 
with respect to DITR, i.e., Figure 3 is unchanged from Figure 1. In Appendix G we provide some 
intuition and a sketch of the analytical results for coincidences of the areas of determinacy and 
learnability under a CPITR and DITR specifications.  
 
3.2.2 Forecast-Based Specification (FB-CPITR) 
Under a forecast-based CPI Inflation Taylor Rule (FB-CPITR), the Central Bank follows a 
policy rule of the form of (16). Plugging (3) and (6) into the rule, the domestic interest rate can 
be rewritten as 
(58) 
where  and   
By combining (1) and (2) with (58), we can reduce the system to two equations involving 
the endogenous variables  and  The reduced system is then given by 
(59) 
where  ,  ,  and  is defined by 
                                                       
21 Bullard and Schaling (2005) study a similar environment. Their results coincides with ours in the case of a small 
open economy. The authors also found that when small open economy assumption is dropped, interaction with the 
rest of the world is important in the sense that it modifies the conditions for a determinate and learnable equilibrium 
in the domestic economy.   28
 60 
Since both  and  are free variables, determinacy requires both the eigenvalues of 
to be inside the unit circle. The following proposition summarizes the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a rational expectations equilibrium to be unique.  
Proposition 2.  Under FB-CPITR, the necessary and sufficient conditions for a rational 
expectations equilibrium to be unique are that 
   
(61), (62), (63) and (64) 
Proof. See Appendix B.  
For  -dating of expectations, the MSV solution takes the form of  with 
and  and the T-mapping from the PLM to the ALM is given 
by, The following proposition provides the conditions for E-stability 
of the MSV solution.  
Proposition 3. Suppose the time t information set is  Under FB-CPITR, the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for an MSV solution  to be E-stable are that 
(65) and (66) 
Proof. See Appendix C.  
It is noticeable that FB-CPITR modifies both determinacy and learnability conditions 
respect to FB-DITR. The main effect of openness is given by conditions (63) and (65), which 
clearly constrain the higher permissible values for  On the opposite, the lower bound for  is   29
still dictated by conditions (64) and (66). For example, in the case of determinacy, if there is a 
null response to the expected output gap (i.e.,  is zero), the limits for  are 
 
whereas in the case of E-stability the limits are, 
 
Thus, there exists a determinate and learnable equilibrium as long as the sensitivity of the 
interest rate to expected CPI inflation is approximately lower than the inverse of openness. 
Consequently, as the degree of openness increases, the scope of values for  that guarantees 
determinacy and E-stability shrinks significantly. Remarkably, the Taylor Principle should be 
viewed as a necessary but not as a sufficient condition for learnability. This result contrasts with 
those of a closed economy, which suggest that the Taylor Principle guarantees E-stability; see 
BM (2002). The idea that the Taylor principle or “active” policy is a matter of changing nominal 
interest rates more than one-for-one with inflation is a celebrated result in the literature. It is 
almost always thought of as a pure inequality. The idea that open economy considerations create 
an upper bound on how aggressive policymakers can be with respect to inflation is striking and 
simple in this framework  
To clarify these results, Figure 4. depicts determinacy and learnability conditions at the 
baseline parameter values for closed and open economies. Because in a closed economy 
domestic and CPI inflation are the same concept,
22 the plot corresponding to the closed economy 
case coincides with the left panel of Figure 2.  
As in the case of FB-DITR, determinate equilibrium is always expectationally stable, but 
the reverse does not occur. However, as discussed above, activism against future CPI inflation 
deviations from its target is remarkably bound not only for determinacy but also for E-stability. 
For example, in our benchmark calibration  must lie between 1 and (around) 2.5 in order to 
achieve a determinate and learnable equilibrium in the open-economy case.
23 Unlike previous 
                                                       
22 Notice that as  , when CPI inflation coincides with domestic inflation, determinacy and E-stability 
conditions for FB-CPITR converge to the conditions found by BM (2002) for the closed economy counterpart. 
23 Moreover, the parametrization of Taylor (1993),  and  implies that a degree of openness of 
roughly more than 0.66 could easily induce both indeterminacy and E-instability.   30
feedback rules, it is certain that the degree of openness together with the presence of expected 
CPI inflation in the policy rule unambiguously reduces both determinate and E-stable areas.  
 




















Note: Closed  and open  economies. 
 
Our interpretation is that the reduction of determinate and E-stable areas comes from the 
interaction between activism in the policy rule and openness. Any increase (decrease) in the 
interest rate due to inflationary (deflationary) expectations triggered by an expected depreciation 
(appreciation) of nominal exchange rate reinforces the expectation of higher (lower) CPI 
inflation. In this context, the likelihood of a consequent movement in the interest rate relies on 
the preferences of the central bank, given by  , and the degree of openness.  
Therefore, if either the degree of openness or the aggressiveness of the monetary policy 
with respect to expected CPI inflation is high, the economy is likely to be stuck in an 
indeterminate equilibria that private agents would not be able to learn. The final consequence is 
that the central bank would face excessive volatility of the macroeconomic aggregates due to 
self-fulfilling expectations. In this circumstance, it would not be possible to anchor private 
agents’ expectations to their target values.  
 
3.3 CPI Managed Exchange Rate Taylor Rule 
3.3.1 Contemporaneous Specification (CPI-METR)   31
 
Under the contemporaneous Managed Exchange Rate Taylor rule (CPI-METR), we follow the 
same criteria used in the case of CPITR. Combining equations (1), (3), (11) and (17) and using 
definitions (6) and (12), we obtain a collapsed system of three equations involving the 
endogenous variables  and  that can be represented as 
(67) 
where  . Variable  collects non-predetermined variables, 
whereas  collects states or predetermined variables. Vector  denotes the exogenous variables 
of the system. Matrix  is given by  
(68) 
The equilibrium is determinate if and only if the 3x3 matrix  has exactly two 
eigenvalues outside the unit circle and one eigenvalue inside the unit circle. The proof is similar 
to the CPITR case.  
Proposition 4.  Under CPI-METR the necessary and sufficient condition for a rational 
expectations equilibrium to be unique is that 
(69) 
Proof. Appendix D. 
Condition (69) is slightly different from condition (50), given in Proposition 1. Any 
additional reaction of the interest rate to movements in the nominal exchange rate, measured by 
, shrinks the lower limits of both  and  . Notice that (69) can be re-written as 
Therefore,  ceteris paribus, the determinacy region increases 
with the degree of reaction of the interest rate to the nominal exchange rate, which is clear from 
the  component of the “new” Taylor Principle. Moreover, when interest rate reacts 
one-for-one to nominal exchange rate movements (i.e.,  is 1), monetary policy can induce   32
determinacy even with a negligible response to CPI inflation and/or the output gap. Analogous to 
DITR and CPITR, the degree of openness modifies determinacy conditional on whether 
holds or not.  
We emphasize that managed exchange rate promotes both determinacy and learnability 
of equilibrium in open economies in the same way as the lagged interest rate in the policy rule 
(so-called policy inertia) does it in the closed economy counterpart, see Woodford (2003a) and 
Bullard and Mitra (2006). In fact, since the current nominal exchange rate varies one-for-one 
with the lagged of domestic interest rate, the inclusion of the former in the policy rule works as if 
there actually were inertia in the domestic interest rate.  
E-stability analysis is performed by re-writing (67) in a matrix system in the form 
of where  . Matrices are   
 
(70), (71) and (72) 
where  In the same way as CPITR, we study the E-
stability of the MSV quantitatively. The sketch of the proof for E-stability can be derived 






                                                       
24 See Section 3.2.1. A detailed proof can be obtained from the authors upon request.   33



















Note: Both graphics correspond to open economies  . The graphic on the left shows the 
case of CPITR or no managed exchange rate  and the graphic on the right shows the 
case of CPI-METR  . 
 
Figure 5 shows our results under two different values of  for a given degree of openness 
(  equals  ). The picture on the left plots the results when there is no response to the nominal 
exchange rate,  is zero, i.e., policymakers follow a CPITR. In the picture on the right, we 
assume that monetary authority reacts to the nominal exchange rate as well as CPI inflation and 
the output gap. In the latter, we calibrate the value of  to be  . In both cases, determinacy 
and E-stable areas perfectly coincide and multiple equilibria are not learnable. More interesting 
is that a central bank reacting passively to inflation  and simultaneously targeting 
movements in the exchange rate in the policy rule  can induce a determinate and E-
stable equilibrium even with a null response to the output gap. For instance, when  is zero, the 
lower bound of  under CPI-METR is around  . Even more important, if  is larger than 
one, any positive values for  and  would imply both determinate and E-stable equilibrium. 
Therefore, additional reaction to nominal exchange rate increases the determinate and learnable 
regions.
25 A central bank that reacts to exchange rates movements is implicitly taking into 
                                                       
25 In contrast to the previous analyses, in this section we have focused on managed exchange rate rather than 
openness. Nevertheless, it is worth to emphasize that our numerical results, not shown, confirm that the impact of 
the size of openness ambiguously alters both determinacy and E-stability. Again, the impact on determinacy and   34
account reactions to exogenous shocks, which makes the determinacy region larger. However, 
we should be aware that even though it is easier to induce determinacy, it is also easier to 
generate greater volatility in the endogenous variables, as was pointed out by GM (2005). In a 
nutshell, even if policymakers do not react sufficiently strongly to CPI inflation they can still 
induce determinacy and learnability of equilibrium by reacting sufficiently strongly to the 
nominal exchange rate, although this policy could enhance macroeconomic volatility.  
 
3.3.2 Forecast-Based Specification (FB-CPI-METR) 
In this section we suppose that the monetary authority follows a forecast-based Managed 
Exchange Rate (FB-CPI-METR). First, with the same procedure used for FB-CPITR, the interest 
rate feedback rule (18) can be rewritten as 
(73) 
where  and  Notice that the parameter of nominal exchange 
rate reaction in the rule,  , has modified  and  with respect to FB-CPITR case.  
The system is reduced to two equations involving the endogenous variables  and 
The reduced system is then given by 
(74) 
where  and  is defined by 
  (75) 
Since both  and  are free variables, determinacy requires both the eigenvalues of 
to be inside the unit circle. The following proposition summarizes the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a rational expectations equilibrium to be unique. The proof is straighforward, and 
we can follow the steps of the proof for the FB-CPITR case.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
expectational stability mostly depends on the degree of substitutability between foreign and domestic produced 
goods and the coefficient of risk aversion.   35
Proposition 5.  Under FB-CPI-METR, the necessary and sufficient conditions for a rational 
expectations equilibrium to be unique are that 
 
(76), (77), (78) and (79) 
 
Proof. See Appendix E.   
For  -dating of expectations, the MSV solution takes the form of  with 
and  The following proposition provides the condition for E-stability of 
the MSV solution.  
Proposition 6. Suppose the time t information set is  Under FB-CPI-METR interest rate 
rules, the necessary and sufficient conditions for an MSV solution  to be E-stable are that  
 
 
(80) and (81). 
 
Proof. Appendix F.  
Figure 6 plots the numerical results under two possible values for  . The graph on the 
left depicts the case of FB-CPITR, i.e., when there is a null response to the expected nominal 
exchange rate (  is zero), whereas the graph on the right depicts the case of FB-CPI-METR (  
is 0.6).  
Comparing the conditions under FB-CPI-METR with the conditions obtained under FB-
CPITR, we can note that the degree of managed exchange rate, measured by  , has affected 
both determinacy and learnability conditions. There are two major effects through which 
impact on the stability of the system. First, conditions (79) and (81) imply that an increase in   36
reduces the lower-bound for  . For instance those conditions can be rewritten as 
. The overall reaction to inflation is now captured by the terms 
Like in the case of METR rule,  less than one can guarantee a determinate and 
learnable equilibrium; i.e. under  and  , the lower bound of  is  . Second, 
coupled with the degree of openness, any positive reaction to expected nominal exchange rate 
movements reduces the area of determinacy and learnability through (78) and (80), respectively. 
For example, when  is  , those conditions imply that the upper limit for  is around  . 
Different from CPI-METR, if  is constraint to be lower than one, given the fact that both 
and  are assumed to be non-negative.  
 














Note: Both graphics correspond to open economies  . The graphic of the left shows the 
case of FB-CPITR or no managed exchange rate  and the graphic of the right shows the 
case of FB-CPI-METR  . 
 
Consequently, highly open economies joint with a central bank reacting too strongly to 
either future CPI inflation or expected nominal exchange rate movements are more prone to 
indeterminacy and instability. Yet, if the degree of openness and activism towards CPI and   37
exchange rate are moderate, the monetary authority is able to push the economy towards the 
determinate and E-stable region, even with no response to the output gap. More important, a 
passive reaction to expected CPI inflation could success in generating a determinate and E-stable 
path. Overall, it is relevant to analyze this type of rule and its properties since there exists robust 
evidence that Bank of Canada and the Bank of England have been following a similar policy 
rule; see Lubik and Schorfheide (2006).  
 
3.4. Domestic Inflation Managed Exchange Rate Taylor Rule  
3.4.1 Contemporaneous Specification (DI-METR)  
 
Under contemporaneous domestic inflation Managed Exchange Rate Taylor rule (DI-METR), 
we follow the same criteria used in the case of CPITR. Combining equations (1), (3), (11) and 
(19), and using definition (12), we obtain a collapsed system of three equations involving the 
endogenous variables  and   
 
(82), (83) and (84) 
And the exogenous variable  follows, 
(85) 
This system of equations can be represented as, 
  (86) 
where  . Variable  collects non-predetermined variables, 
whereas  collects states or predetermined variables. Vector  denotes the exogenous variables 
of the system. Matrix  is given by   38
 (87) 
The equilibrium is determinate if and only if the 3x3 matrix  has exactly two 
eigenvalues outside the unit circle and one eigenvalue inside the unit circle.  
Proposition 7.  Under DI-METR the necessary and sufficient condition for a rational 
expectations equilibrium to be unique is that 
 (88) 
Proof. The proof is straightforward and can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
Condition (88) is exactly the same as we found under CPI-METR. Therefore, the 
determinacy region increases with the degree of reaction of interest rate to nominal exchange rate 
regardless of which index of inflation is in the rule.  
E-stability analysis is performed by re-writing (86) in a matrix system in the form of 
 (89) 
where  . Matrices are   
 
(90), (91) and (92)   39
where  We study the E-stability of the MSV quantitatively.
26  
 



















Note: Both graphics correspond to open economies  . The graphic on the left shows 
the case of DITR or no managed exchange rate  and the graphic on the right shows the 
case of DI-METR  . 
 
Figure 7 shows our results under two different values of  for a given degree of openness 
(  equals  ). The picture on the left plots the results when there is no response to nominal 
exchange rate (i.e.,  is zero): policymakers follow either a CPITR or DITR. In the picture on 
the right, we assume that monetary authority reacts to the nominal exchange rate besides 
domestic inflation and output gap. In the latter, we calibrate the value of  to be  . In both 
cases, determinacy and E-stable areas perfectly coincide and multiple equilibria are not 
learnable. Interestingly a central bank reacting passively to inflation  and simultaneously 
targeting movements in the exchange rate in the policy rule  can induce a determinate 
and E-stable equilibrium even with null response to the output gap. Moreover, if  is larger than 
one, any positive values for  and  would imply both determinate and E-stable equilibrium.  
This class of rule elicits some interesting aspects of both determinacy and E-stability in 
small open economies. Compared with CPI -METR, this type rule delivers the same result. 
                                                       
26 The sketch of E-stability analysis follows Section 3.2.1.   40
Therefore, regardless of the inflation index targeted by the Central Bank, a certain degree of 
exchange rate management helps to avoid both indeterminacy and instability under learning. 
Furthermore, this implies that the direct reaction towards movements in the exchange rate is the 
factor that relaxes both determinacy and E-stability conditions. Instead, contemporaneous 
reaction to CPI inflation does not add anything in terms of determinacy and E-stability even if it 
implies an indirect reaction to nominal exchange rate changes. As noted above, such implicit 
reaction cancels out with the lower reaction to domestic inflation.
27  
 
3.4.2 Forecast-Based Specification  
The central bank follows a policy rule of the form of (20). Plugging (3) into the rule, the 
domestic interest rate can be rewritten as 
 (93) 
where  and  . Notice that  modifies  and  .  
The system is reduced to two equations involving the endogenous variables  and 
The reduced system is then given by 
(94) 
where  and  is defined by 
  
(95) 
Since both  and  are free variables, determinacy requires both the eigenvalues of  to be 
inside the unit circle. The following proposition summarizes the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a rational expectations equilibrium to be unique.  
Proposition 8.  Under FB-DI-METR, the necessary and sufficient conditions for a rational 
expectations equilibrium to be unique are that 
                                                       
27 Contrary to this, Bullard and Schaling (2006) found that the interaction with the rest of the world is important in 
the sense that it modifies the conditions for a determinate and learnable equilibrium in the domestic economy.   41
 
 (96), (97), (98) and (99) 
Proof. The proof is straightforward and can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
For  -dating of expectations, the MSV solution takes the form of  with 
and  . The following proposition provides the conditions for E-stability of 
the MSV solution.  
Proposition 9. Suppose the time t information set is  Under FB-DI-METR, the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for an MSV solution  to be E-stable are that  
 
 (100) and (101)  
Proof. The proof is straightforward and can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
First, note that the degree of managed exchange rate  affects both determinacy and 
learnability conditions. On one side,  restricts the determinacy region through conditions (97) 
and (98). On the other side, a positive  relaxes both determinacy and E-stability conditions 
through conditions (99) and (101), respectively. However, although  helps, reacting 
excessively to expected exchange rate movements causes indeterminacy and expectational 
instability. 
Figure 8 illustrates the intersections of the regions of determinacy and learnability of the 
MSV solution at the baseline parametrization assuming the open economy case. The graph on 
the left shows the case of FB-DITR or no managed exchange rate whereas the graph on the right 
shows the case of FB-DI-METR. We can note that a managed exchange rate is detrimental in 
terms of determinacy because shrinks the upper limit to  . However, as in other rules with 
managed exchange rate, FB-DI-METR guarantees stability even if a central bank reacts 
passively to domestic inflation  .    42














Note: Both graphics correspond to open economies  . The graphic on the left shows the 
case of FB-DITR or no managed exchange rate  and the graphic on the right shows the 
case of FB-DI-METR  . 
 
Analyzing this type of rule helps us to disentangle some key features observed under 
forward-looking CPI-based rules. As we stressed earlier, reacting to expected CPI inflation 
imposes an upper bound to  approximately equal to the inverse of openness. Thus, we 
concluded that as the degree of openness increases, the scope of values for  that guarantees 
determinacy and E-stability shrinks significantly. Our interpretation was that the reduction of the 
determinate and E-stable area comes from the interaction between activism against CPI inflation 
and openness: any increase (decrease) of the interest rate due to inflationary (deflationary) 
expectations triggered by an expected depreciation (appreciation) of nominal exchange rate, 
reinforces the expectation of higher (lower) CPI inflation. In this context, we claimed, the 
likelihood of a consequent movement in the interest rate relies on the preferences of the central 
bank, given by  , and the degree of openness. Our results with FB-DI-METR confirm that 
interpretation: reacting to the expected changes in nominal exchange rate does not threaten E-
stability as long as the central bank is not targeting future CPI inflation.  
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4. Learnability and Volatility 
 
As shown in previous sections, some forms of managed exchange rate rules make the conditions 
of determinacy and learnability less stringent in small open economies. For example, in the 
particular case of the FB-DI-METR rule (equation (20)), to the extent that  lies between zero 
and one, the region of both E-stability and determinacy gets larger. In fact, the larger  the less 
likely the economy will fall in a indeterminate or expectational instable region. The above result 
suggests that a FB-DI-METR rule might be desirable based on the criteria of both determinacy 
and learnability compared to a FB-DITR rule (equation (14)). 
Yet, there is another dimension to consider in order conclude whether managed exchange 
rate rules (i.e., FB-DI-METR) are desirable. In particular, it is important to quantify the volatility 
that these types of rules induce to the endogenous macro variables, such as the output gap and 
inflation. We illustrate this issue by obtaining analytically the unconditional volatility of 
domestic inflation and output gap under different Taylor rules. In particular, in this section we 
establish a link between the implied volatility that a particular rule generates vis-à-vis the 
conditions of E-stability implied by the rule. We do so by obtaining the analytical solutions of 
the rational expectations of two specifications: FB-DITR specification 
and FB-DI-METR  .  
We argue that if the managed exchange rate rule (FB-DI-METR) generates larger 
volatility in the economy, the rule is less desirable in this dimension. As will become clear in the 
next two sub-sections, the benefits of each rule will depend on the source of shocks. Under a 
natural interest rate shock, if the managed exchange rate rule  induces smaller volatility 
with respect to the domestic inflation Taylor rule  , then the FB-DI-METR will be more 
desirable. On the other hand, when the economy is hit by a foreign nominal interest rate shock, 
the FB-DITR induces smaller volatility compared to that generated by a FB-DI-METR rule, 
hence the latter rule is less desirable.  
We follow Gali and Monacelli in this discussion and we find reasonable to stay closer to 
that analysis given that we are focusing in understanding variants on standard policy 
prescriptions that would apply in small open economy settings. An alternative would be to 
follow Evans and Honkapohja (2003, RES) and find optimal policy rules in the linear class that 
will also be consistent with determinacy and learnability.    44
 
4.1 Volatility and Natural Interest Rate Shock  
We solve the rational expectations of the economy by using the undetermined coefficient 
method. We first assume that the natural interest rate shock is the only driving force of dynamics 
in this economy. We combine the aggregate supply equation (1), the aggregate demand equation 
(2) and the FB-DITR equation (14) to solve the system. We guess the solutions for domestic 




where  and  denote the partial elasticity of domestic inflation and the output gap with 
respect to the natural interest rate shock, respectively. Rewriting the AS equation 
 
re-writing the IS equation 
 
and combining the above equations with our guessed solution we obtain 
 
After some algebra we can obtain the solutions for  and   
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(102) and (103) 
From the above analytical solutions it is straightforward to see that the volatility of both 
domestic inflation and the output gap are decreasing in  and  to the extent that  and 
. Remember that the Taylor principle is a necessary condition for E-stability. Therefore, 
to the extent that the FB-DITR satisfies the Taylor Principle, the greater the reaction to inflation 
the more stable the system is.  
Now we obtain the analytical solutions of the system based on FB-DI-METR. Combining 
rule (20) with the UIP condition (3) we can re-write the rule as 
(104) 
where and   
Notice that the natural interest rate shock is the only source of volatility  , so that  .  
From the above implied Taylor rule, the analytical solutions of the rational expectations 
equilibrium are the following 
 
 (105) and (106) 
where  and  represent the partial elasticity of domestic inflation and the output gap with 
respect to the natural interest rate shock induced by a FB-DI-METR rule.  
First, notice that in the limiting case, when  . However, 
this is not a relevant case since from the E-stability condition (100) we know that  . 
The interesting case is the one in which  Under this scenario the unconditional 
variances of both  and  are decreasing in  . Therefore, conditional on a natural interest rate   46
shock, reacting to the expected changes in the exchange rate is beneficial in terms of volatility 
since the analytics show smaller partial elasticities; that is  and  . The 
economic intuition for previous findings can be explained as follows. Suppose that there is an 
increase in the natural interest rate  Following the shock we should observe increases in 
both the output gap and inflation. The central bank reacts by increasing the nominal interest rate 
generating an expected depreciation (through the UIP condition), which in turn induces a further 
increase in inflation. On the other hand, if the central bank puts some weight, in its reaction 
function, on expected movements in the exchange rate, it will partially offset the expected 
depreciation generated by the increase in the domestic nominal interest rate, therefore making 
domestic inflation to increase by less.  
Interestingly, under perfect peg, that is  , we obtain that 
. Thus, a perfect peg will generate instability in a small open economy, 
a result that is consistent with GM’s findings. Instead, if  the economy can become 
more stable; yet this case has not been analyzed by GM.  
To gather more insight of the previous result, Figure 9 depicts  under different values 
of  and  . We set the rest of parameters at their baseline parametrization and assume that the 
degree of openness is  and  is  . The figure confirms the analytics: as the degree of 
managed exchange rate increases,  (and volatility) decreases. A similar pattern is observed for 
. Nevertheless, the reduction in volatility is more notorious under  than  This result 
highlights an interesting trade-off in open economies: compared with  increasing  might be 
more beneficial in terms of macroeconomic volatility, but at the same time increases the 
likelihood of indeterminacy and expectational instability. Obviously, the same discussion applies 
to   
Yet, notice that if we allow simultaneously for foreign nominal interest rate shocks, FB-
DI-METR might generate larger volatility in the endogenous variables, mitigating its beneficial 
effects. We develop this result in the next sub-section.  
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Figure 9. Sensitivity of  with respecto to  and   
 
Note: The rest of parameters are set at their baseline parametrization. The degree of openness is 
and  is  . 
 
4.2. Volatility and Foreign Interest Rate Shock 
 
Notice that the implied managed exchange rate rule (20), once the foreign interest rate shock is 
taken into account, can be re-written as 
(107) 
where  and  and  have been defined previously. The term  was absent in the 
previous case, so it is clear from the above rule that the central bank has a direct reaction to the 
foreign interest rate shock. Let us assume the foreign interest rate shock that hits the economy 
has the following AR(1) process 
(108) 
where  is the autorregresive coefficient. If we assume the solutions for the endogenous 
variables are   48
 
the analytical solutions collapse to 
 
 
which can be re-expressed as 
(109) and (110) 
 
where  and   
The variances of both domestic inflation and the output gap are increasing in  . Given 
the E-stability conditions, the only relevant case is the one when  . Notice that under 
reasonable parametrization  Therefore,  and  will be increasing in  .  
To sum up, a FB-DI-METR can be beneficial in terms of volatility if only shocks to the 
natural interest rate are present. But, as long as foreign interest rate shocks are considered, a FB-
DI-METR could be less desirable in terms of macroeconomic volatility. Therefore, we argue 
that, in addition to the E-stability criterion that a Taylor rule has to meet, it is important to 
evaluate which are the implications in terms of volatility of a Taylor-type rule in order to 




Using the GM (2005) small open economy model, we have studied the determinacy and 
learnability conditions the of rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, we have extended 
BM (2002) results to a small open economy framework under a handful of possible Taylor-type   49
instrument rules. Our analytical results highlight an important link between the Taylor Principle 
and both determinacy and learnability of REE in small open economies. The degree of openness 
coupled with the nature of the policy rule adopted by the monetary authorities might change this 
link in important ways. Perhaps the main conclusion is that a pure, naive application of the 
Taylor principle in open economy settings could be misleading.  
With  contemporaneous rules, we show that openness affects stability conditions 
quantitatively. The final impact of openness, in terms of enlargement of the determinacy region, 
is ambiguous and depends on the degree of the elasticity of substitution between tradable goods. 
More importantly, conditions for unique and learnable REE do not depend on whether the central 
bank responds to domestic or CPI inflation, i.e., the Taylor Principle is a necessary and sufficient 
condition under both policies. Yet, we have shown that a managed exchange rate regime relaxes 
the constraint on the degree of response to inflation and alleviates problems of indeterminacy and 
expectational instability.  
We have stressed that in the case of forecast-based monetary rules, openness imposes an 
additional constraint, making it more difficult to induce a determinate and learnable solution. 
Indeed, the Taylor Principle does not guarantees E-stability, as it is the case in a closed economy 
(BM 2002). When the central bank follows either CPI inflation targeting or a managed exchange 
rate, the determinacy and learnability region shrinks significantly. Domestic inflation targeting 
does not suffer from this problem, instead suggesting that more aggressive reaction towards 
inflation is all to the good as in the closed economy case. Therefore, in order to avoid 
indeterminacy and expectational instability problems forward-looking central banks in open 
economies should adopt some kind of “inward-looking” policy by focusing on domestic 
inflation.  
In this paper we emphasize the crucial role of openness along with alternative policy 
rules for the analysis of E-stability in open economies. The analysis of stability under learning in 
open economies provides new insights regarding the desirability of the policy rule. We find that 
conditions of learnability are more stringent in open economies with respect to closed 
economies. Therefore, it is more likely that a small open economy will to fall into an E-unstable 
region, so policymakers should be quite cautions about the instrument rule employed.  
However, some managed Taylor rules exhibit desirable determinacy and learnability 
properties. In particular, a domestic inflation Taylor rule augmented by an exchange rate target   50
allows the monetary authority to mitigate the threats of indeterminacy and expectational 
instability, although in terms of macroeconomic volatility these rules might not be desirable. We 
conclude that it is worthwhile to recommend not only rules that are desirable in terms of 
determinacy and learnability properties but also those that induce benefits in terms of 
macroeconomic volatility.  
Finally, one important question our paper raises but does not answer is the following: If a 
rule is desirable in terms of both macroeconomic stability and E-stability, how fast do private 
agents learn this rule? Analyzing the speed of learning under the broad set of rules analyzed in 
this paper will add another dimension through which the desirability of a rule should be 
evaluated, and we think this would be a highly useful undertaking.  
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6. Appendices: Proofs 
6.1 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 
Here we closely follow Woodford’s proof of determinacy of a Taylor rule with some form of 
partial adjustment of the short term interest rate (Woodford 2003b, Chapter 4). Let the 
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and where   
The above equation has one root inside the unit circle and two roots outside if and only if:  




We can rule out this first case because coefficients  contradict  .  




and (Case III):   52
 
Notice that both cases share the first condition  , which can be reduced to 
 
By replacing  and  we obtain 
 (A6) 
which is a necessary condition for determinacy. By considering the signs of coefficients 
holds.  
The additional condition required for Case II  can be written 
after some manipulation as 
(A7) 
and the remaining condition needed for Case III  can be written as 
 (A8) 
Equilibrium is determinate if and only if the coefficients of the policy rule (15) satisfy (A6) and 
either (A7) or (A8) . We will show that under the sign assumption, (A6) is both necessary and 
sufficient for determinacy.  
We prove this by showing that any parameter values that satisfy (A6) and not (A8) must 
necessarily satisfy (A7).  
First let’s write (A8) as, 
 (A9) 
Note that under the sign assumption, the above equation can fail to hold only if 
(here we use the fact that  Note that  necessarily 
implies that  since     53
Now we need to show that under these circumstances (A7) holds given  . 
Notice that (A7) can be expressed as 
(A10) 
The first two terms (A10) corresponds to condition (A6) which, along with 
, guarantees that (A10) will hold. Therefore, (A6) or (50) in the main text, is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy. 
 
6.2 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2 




with  and  Both eigenvalues of  are inside the unit circle if and 




After replacing the definitions of  and  we can note that condition (B3) implies (62), 
whereas condition (B4) implies (63) and (64). The only relevant case is  given by (61). 
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6.3 Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3 
Using results of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), E-stability requires that the eigenvalues of 
(  is given by equation. (60) to have real parts less than one. The eigenvalues of  are given by 
the product of the eigenvalues of  and  and since  it suffices that eigenvalues of   
have parts less than 1. On the other hand, the MSV solution will not be E-stable if any 




where  and   
It is necessary for both eigenvalues of  to have negative real parts. According to the 
Routh Theorem, that condition holds if and only if  and  . We can note that 
 (C3) 
After replacing the definitions of  and  , under the case of  ,  implies 
In this case, the second E-stability condition, given by (66), is derived from  . As 
in determinacy analysis, there is a second case,  However, this case is not relevant, 
since it contradicts  .  
 
6.4 Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4  
Here we closely follow proof 1 for CPITR. Let the characteristic equation of the matrix 
(defined in equation (68) be written in the form 
where 




The above equation has one root inside the unit circle and two roots outside if and only if either 
Case I, II or III holds (see proof of Proposition 1). Since coefficients  contradict 
, we can rule out this first case.  
Condition  (shared by Case I and II) can be reduced to 
(D4) 
Therefore, condition (D4) is a necessary condition for determinacy. Given the signs of 
the coefficients  (shared by Case I and II) holds.  
The additional condition required for Case II  can be written, 
after some manipulation, as 
(D5) 
and the remaining condition needed for Case III  can be written as 
(D6) 
Equilibrium is determinate if and only if the coefficients of the policy rule (17) satisfy (D4) and 
either (D5) or (D6). We will show that under the sign assumption, (D4) is both necessary and 
sufficient for determinacy.  
We prove this by showing that any parameter values that satisfy (D4) and not(D6) must 
necessarily satisfy (D5).  
First we will write (D6) as 
(D7)   56
Note that under the sign assumption, the above equation can fail to hold only if 
(here we use the fact that  Note that  , necessarily implies that 
since   
Now we need to show that, under these circumstances, (D5) holds given  . 
Notice that (D5) can be expressed as 
(D8) 
The first two terms (D8) corresponds to condition (D4) which along with 
guarantees that (D8) will hold. Therefore, (D4), or (69) in the main text, is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for determinacy.  
 
6.5 Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 5 
The characteristic polynomial of  (given by (75)) is   where 
(E1) 
(E2) 
where  and   
Both eigenvalues of  are inside the unit circle if and only if conditions (B3) and (B4) 
hold. After replacing the definitions of  and  we can note that condition (B3) implies (77), 
whereas condition (B4) implies (78) and (79). The only relevant case is  , given 
by (76). The other case is  which implies  given that  lies between 
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6.6 Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 6 
As in the previous cases, E-stability conditions are given by analyzing the characteristic 
polynomial of  (where  is given by 75) given by  where 
  (F1) 
(F2) 
where  and   
It is necessary for both eigenvalues of  to have negative real parts. According to the 
Routh Theorem, that condition holds if and only if  and  . We can note 
 (F3) 
After replacing the definitions of  and  , we can note that under the case of 
,  implies  In this case, the second E-stability condition, given by 
(81), is derived from  . As in determinacy analysis, there is a second case which implies 
However, this case is not relevant, since it contradicts  .  
 
6.7 Appendix G: Coincidence of Determinacy and Learnability under CPITR and DITR 
6.7.1 MSV Solution, Intuition and Analytics under Learning 
In this appendix we provide some intuition and a sketch of the analytical results for coincidences 
of the areas of determinacy and learnability under a CPITR and DITR specifications. In order to 
do so, we first obtain the stationary MSV solution of the system. Notice that given that the 
Taylor principle guarantees that the system is determinate, the MSV solution of the system has to 
be stationary. Under the contemporaneous CPITR rule the system takes the form of (55).  
Given that there is just one predetermined variable, i.e.,  we know that  has its two 
first columns filled with zeros. Thus, 
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(G1) 
where  and  are coefficients. Note that the MSV solution requires  to be stationary. 
Explicitly, the MSV solution takes the form 
(G2) 
By applying the method of undetermined coefficients we obtain, 
(G3) 
Now we express the coefficients  and  as functions of   
 (G4) 




 (G6)   59
By applying the Descartes Rule of signs we know that there are three positive roots or one 
positive root and a pair of complex conjugates. Notice that when the policy rule corresponds to 
domestic inflation targeting that is  and  we obtain 
  and  . It follows that 
(G7) 
Similarly, this solution is also obtained when the degree of openness is zero. In this case, the 
inertia displayed by the system only comes from the inertia of exogenous variables. 
Yet, under the CPITR, the MSV solution needs  to be stationary. We evaluate the 
above polynomial in  ,  and  . It is straightforward to show that  and  are both 
negative. Solving for  we have 
 (G8) 
which could be positive or negative. In order to have a positive root between  and  , we 
need  After replacing  and  , one can note that  if and only if the 
condition for determinacy holds; see Proposition 1. Hence, the previous results confirm that there 
exists a unique and stationary solution given that  . This is an alternative way to show 
that the Taylor Principle is a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy.  
 
6.7.2 E-Stability: Analytics 
Now we show that the Taylor Principle is a necessary condition for stability under learning 
dynamics. First we analyze the E-stability condition for  , given by (31). The MSV solution 
will be E-stable if all eigenvalues of  have a real part less than 1. Therefore, it is necessary 
for both eigenvalues of  to have negative real parts.  
It can be shown that  has one eigenvalue equal to  . The rest of eigenvalues can 
be obtained from the following characteristics polynomial
28 
(G9) 
where   60
(G10) 
with (for sake of exposition, let us assume that  ): 
(G11) 
To be E-stable, we need  and  (Routh-Hurwitz Theorem). It is 
straightforward to see that  and  are positive as long as the equilibrium is determinate and 
and  Suppose that  then 
will always be the case. Hence, to the extent that  the 
Taylor Principle guarantees the first E-stability condition. Our quantitative results confirm this 
analysis. 
In the rest of the proof we use the fact that the eigenvalues of the Kronecker product of 
two matrices are equal to the cross product of the eigenvalues of each matrix.
29 Using this 
property we can note that the second E-stability condition (32) needs  to hold given that  has 
eigenvalues with real parts less than  . Similarly, the E-stability condition  depends on 
whether or not  has eigenvalues with real parts less than 1 provided that E-
stability condition for  holds. Using (56), we can re-write  as 
(G12) 
Since the eigenvalues of any matrix are exactly the same as that of its transpose, the 
eigenvalues of  must have its real part less than one. From the MSV solution we know that  has 
two eigenvalues equal to  and one eigenvalue equal to  . As shown, the Taylor Principle 
                                                                                                                                                                           
28 To obtain these results we adapted some Mathematica programs used by Bullard and Mitra (2006).  
29 Let  and  square matrices of dimensions  and  . If  are the eigenvalues of  and 
are the eigenvalues of  , then  are the eigenvalues of 
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guarantees that  lies between  and  . This result, coupled with our proposition for  , 
implies that the eigenvalues of  have real parts less than  if the equilibrium is determinate. 
Therefore, the Taylor Principle is a necessary condition for E-stability for a CPITR.    62
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